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The conventional assumption made by cost-benefit analysts is that
individual preference structures are not altered by any of the policies that
are under consideration. This simplifying "exogenous preferences"
assumption is not always satisfied, however, and in some instances the
preference structures of a significant proportion of the people who are
impacted by a policy are "endogenous" in that they are also altered by
that policy. Under those endogenous preferences circumstances an
important question is presented as to whether the willingness to pay-
based valuations of the impacts of the policies should be calculated with
regard to the pre-policy implementation preference structures, or instead
with regard to the different post-policy implementation preference
structures, including any transitional preference structures that may exist
for a period of time, or perhaps with regard to some combination of the
above.
Several prominent scholars have previously addressed aspects of
this inquiry, including most importantly Gary Becker, Cass Sunstein,
Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, and Samuel Bowles, but the endogenous
preferences valuation question has not yet been definitively resolved, and
virtually all cost-benefit analysts continue to ignore the implications of
the possibility of endogenous preferences in their work. In this article, I
assess the merits of Becker's "extended utility function" valuation
approach, and of the various valuation suggestions offered by Sunstein,
Dau-Schmidt, or Bowles. I also offer my own thoughts regarding how
the endogenous preferences valuation problem can be best addressed.
My main conclusions are that the willingness to pay-based
valuations of policies should be derived solely from the post-policy
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implementation preference structures, as a general matter, and that if
there are any transitional preferences structures they should also be used
to value those policy consequences that occur while they are in existence.
These conclusions have significant implications for the valuation of
environmental policies, as well as of policies of any sort that have as one
of their major objectives the shaping of character and the alteration of
attitudes and preferences. This theoretical endogenous preferences
valuation framework may need to be modified at times to accommodate
preference structure estimation difficulties and to counter potential
analyst bias, particularly with regard to prospective cost-benefit analyses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Cost-benefit analysis is the most important policy evaluation
technique now used in American public sector decision-making.' This
approach is claimed to be effective in helping policy makers identify
those measures that will broadly advance social welfare,2 and as a means
of countering the efforts of special interest groups that often resist their
implementation.3  Cost-benefit analysis plays a particularly important
role in determining federal environmental standards and in other federal
administrative rulemaking.4 The prominent legal scholar Cass Sunstein
1. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF
COST-BENEFIT REGULATORY PROTECTION (Am. Bar Ass'n 2002). Some recent writers
use the inverted phrase "benefit-cost analysis" to describe this form of analysis, but in
this article I will consistently use the traditional label.
2. See E.J. MISHAN, COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS X (Praeger Publishers 1976) ("[I]n
cost-benefit analysis we are concerned with the economy as a whole, with the welfare of
a defined society, and not any smaller part of it.").
3. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 26-28.
4. This method of policy evaluation was used to some extent in regulatory reviews
under the Nixon, Ford, and Carter Administrations. President Nixon first created a
"Quality of Life Review" that gave the Office of Management and Budget limited
regulatory review authority. President Ford then required several federal agencies to also
provide inflation impact statements for review by the Council on Wage and Price
Stability. President Carter took another significant step towards institutionalizing cost-
benefit analysis as an aspect of federal rulemaking when he established the Regulatory
Analysis Review Group and issued Executive Order 12044, which required economic
impact statements for all proposed rules having an overall impact of more than $100
million. See generally Murray Weidenbaum, Regulatory Process Reform from Ford to
Clinton, 20 REG. (1997), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/regv20nl/
reg20nla.html; THOMAS 0. McGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF
REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (Cambridge Univ. Press 1991).
The significance of cost-benefit analysis for federal rulemaking was greatly
enhanced by Executive Order 12291, issued in 1981 by President Reagan. See 46 Fed.
Reg. 13193 (Feb. 17, 1981). Executive Order 12291 required many proposed executive
branch regulatory initiatives to be accompanied by a Regulatory Impact Analysis
containing an extensive cost-benefit analysis of the proposal that had to be submitted to
and approved by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, a new office created
within the Office of Management and Budget, before the proposed regulation could
become effective. The Clinton Administration later replaced Executive Order 12291 with
a new Executive Order 12866 which made some minor changes in wording and
procedures, but which retained the substance of the cost-benefit analysis requirement for
major rulemaking initiatives. See 58 Fed. Reg. 51735 (Sept. 30, 1993). The Bush
Administration has also continued this policy.
Congress has also enacted numerous statutes in recent years requiring federal
agencies to perform cost-benefit analyses in connection with their rulemaking efforts.
See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J.
165, 167 (1999). Prospective cost-benefit analyses of rulemaking initiatives and
subsequent Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs review (and, upon occasion,
also judicial review) therefore now appear to be entrenched as a significant feature of the
federal regulatory process. Similarly, cost-benefit analyses are now also utilized to a
lesser extent by many state governmental agencies for similar purposes. See SUNSTEIN,
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has gone so far as to claim that "[the] American government is becoming
a cost-benefit state,"s and to endorse this development as helping to
rationalize government decision-making and insulate it from the pressure
of special interest groups, as well as increasing regulatory transparency
and public accountability.
While Sunstein's descriptive claim regarding the extensive use of
the cost-benefit methodology appears to be well founded,' his
endorsement of this trend is more problematic. In particular, there is
considerable controversy regarding whether cost-benefit analysis
provides an adequately inclusive and unbiased means of assessing
policies and programs.9 The literature on this topic is extensive and
includes a significant number of articles that sharply criticize this
approach. o
The essential feature of cost-benefit analysis is the embrace of the
willingness to pay valuation criterion. All impacts of the policies under
consideration are measured, to the extent feasible, by the affected
persons' willingness to pay to obtain the resulting benefits, or to avoid
the resulting burdens. Those benefit and cost measures are then
aggregated into bottom-line economic efficiency assessments that do not
address distributional considerations or rights-respecting limitations."
supra note 1, at 26-28. See generally Robert W. Hahn, State and Federal Regulatory
Reform: A Comparative Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 873 (2000).
5. SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 19-20.
6. Id. at 26-28.
7. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis
When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1105 (2000); Robert W. Hahn
& Paul C. Tetlock, Has Economic Analysis Improved Regulatory Decisions?, 22 J. ECON.
PERSP. 67, 68 (2008). But see generally Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein's Cost-Benefit Lite:
Economics for Liberals, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191 (2004) (criticizing Sunstein's claim
as to the pervasiveness ofcost-benefit analysis).
8. See Douglas A. Kysar, It Might Have Been: Risk, Precaution and Opportunity
Costs, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 5-6 (2006) ("The basic superiority of CBA
[cost-benefit analysis] as a tool for risk regulation ... is no longer seriously doubted . . .
[e]xcept, of course ... by serious observers of the administrative state."). See generally
Sinden, supra note 7.
9. See Sinden, supra note 7, at 201 (citing a voluminous literature offering
criticisms of cost-benefit analysis); Adler & Posner, supra note 4, at 167 ("The reputation
of cost-benefit analysis . . . among American academics has never been as poor as it is
today."). See generally Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless:
Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1553 (2002)
(presenting a highly critical view of cost-benefit analysis); Kysar, supra note 8
(presenting a highly critical view of cost-benefit analysis).
10. See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 4; Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 9;
Kysar, supra note 8.
11. Stated in more theoretical terms, cost-benefit analysis is an attempt to determine
the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency consequences of a policy so that this information can guide
the decision whether or not to implement that policy. A policy will constitute a Kaldor-
Hicks improvement-a move towards Kaldor-Hicks efficiency-if the total benefits of
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Such additional considerations and limitations are taken into account
separately in the decision-making process, if at all.
The numerous critiques of this methodology can be roughly but
usefully classified as being either "external" or "internal."l 2 The external
critiques largely reject the approach altogether. They generally
emphasize the threshold measurement problem posed by what they
regard as the fundamental incommensurability of policy impacts of
different character. They commonly conclude that cost-benefit analysis
is fatally flawed because of the impossibility of meaningfully measuring
diverse impacts ranging from purely financial consequences to loss of
life itself, and including difficult to quantify effects such as the
empathetic sentiments aroused in some persons in support of those
persons more directly affected by a policy, by a unitary monetary
metric.13  These external critiques also commonly focus upon the well-
known shortcomings of the use of economic efficiency as a normative
standard. 14
The internal critiques, in contrast, sidestep these
incommensurability and normative criterion problems by accepting the
desirability of assessing policies primarily or even solely through
aggregating the affected persons' willingness to pay to enjoy or to avoid
the policy exceed its total costs, with both benefits and costs measured by the willingness
to pay of the affected persons to obtain those benefits or avoid those costs. See RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13 (6 ed., Aspen Publishers 2003). The
Kaldor-Hicks criterion is the usual measure of efficiency utilized by economists. Id.
There are several seminal articles and books that developed the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
concepts. See, e.g., John R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J.
696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal
Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); ANTHONY E. BOARDMAN ET AL., COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE (Prentice Hall 2000) (1996); MISHAN, supra note 2.
12. Sinden, supra note 7, at 202.
13. Id. There is an extensive literature advancing external critiques of the cost-
benefit methodology based on the incommensurability problem. See, e.g., Ackerman &
Heinzerling, supra note 9, at 1553, 1563-64; Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the
Cost-Benefit Standard, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 971, 986-89 (2000); Lisa Heinzerling,
Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE L.J. 1981, 1984-85 (1998); Cass R.
Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779, 784 (1994).
See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Policy Science: Analysis or Ideology?, 2 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 66 (1972).
14. There is an extensive literature criticizing the use of economic efficiency as a
normative criterion. See, e.g., Adler & Posner, supra note 4, at 191 ("[B]ecause [Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency] is, taken as a moral principle, unsound, [cost-benefit analysis] cannot
be justified by reference to Kaldor-Hicks."); Ackerman & Heinzerling, supra note 9, at
1567-68; Gregory Scott Crespi, The Mid-Life Crisis of the Law and Economics
Movement: Confronting the Problems ofNonfalsifiability and Normative Bias, 67 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 231, 234-37 (1991); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES
114-50 (Harvard Univ. Press 1987). See generally Symposium, Efficiency as a Legal
Concern, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 485 (1980) (collecting several articles on economic
efficiency).
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their consequences. These critiques instead address the cost-benefit
methodology on its own economic efficiency-oriented terms, and point
out a number of valuation problems that alone or in combination may
render futile attempts to quantify costs and benefits in an objective
manner that does not simply reflect the analyst's personal ethical and
political preferences.' 5 The valuation problems noted by these internal
critiques include the difficulty in determining appropriate discount rates
for use in evaluating future consequences,16 the problem of determining
whether offer prices or instead asking prices are the appropriate measure
of willingness to pay in instances where they diverge in magnitude,17 the
dependence of the magnitude of both offer and asking prices on the
existing distribution of wealth,'" and the perhaps insurmountable
problems posed by the need to incorporate and value the pervasive
"person-altering consequences" of policies.' 9 Those internal critiques
also commonly emphasize the often severe data availability limitations
facing cost-benefit analysts, including the difficulty of often having
inadequate data to confidently establish the willingness to pay of affected
persons for even the known impacts of a policy, 2 0 as well as the common
15. See Adler & Posner, supra note 4, at 202-03. There is an extensive literature
advancing such internal critiques of the cost-benefit methodology. See, e.g., Sinden,
supra note 7, at 205-10 (citing many articles presenting such critiques). See generally
Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the
Discounting ofHuman Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 941 (1999) (criticizing commonly used
approaches to discounting future loss of life consequences).
16. There is an extensive literature relating to the question of the choice of discount
rates by which to discount future impacts in cost-benefit analysis. See generally Revesz,
supra note 15.
17. See Gregory Scott Crespi, Valuation in Cost-Benefit Analysis: Choosing Between
Offer and Asking Prices as the Appropriate Measure of Willingness to Pay, 39 J. MAR. L.
REv. 429, 432 (2006). See generally Russell Korobkin, Note, Policymaking and the
Offer/Asking Problem Price Gap: Towards a Theory of Efficient Entitlement Allocation,
46 STAN. L. REv. 663 (1994).
18. Sinden, supra note 7, at 206-07.
19. The phrase "person-altering consequences" refers to the idea that one of the
consequences of any significant policy is that it will lead to exponentially cascading and
eventually universal changes in the fundamental genetic identities of future persons. The
implementation of that policy will therefore be a necessary condition of the existence of
those future persons, and the policy would obviously be very highly valued by them as a
result regardless of its other consequences for their welfare. See generally Gregory Scott
Crespi, The Fatal Flaw of Cost-Benefit Analysis: The Problem of Person-Altering
Consequences, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10703 (2008) (discussing the nature of person-altering
consequences and their significance for the conduct and validity of cost-benefit analysis)
[hereinafter Crespi (2008)]; Gregory Scott Crespi, What's Wrong with Dumping
Radioactive Wastes in the Ocean? The Surprising Ethical and Policy Analysis
Implications of the Problem of Person-Altering Consequences, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10873
(2007) [hereinafter Crespi (2007)].
20. Sinden, supra note 7, at 208-10 (discussing several problems which call into
question the validity and reliability of various methods of measuring willingness to pay).
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problem of scientific uncertainty as to both the scope and magnitude of
the likely consequences of many policies or programs.2 1
I have previously attempted to contribute to both branches of this
22critical literature. In this article, however, I will not address any of
these prior external or internal critiques. I will instead elaborate upon a
different internal critique of the cost-benefit methodology, one which has
been underappreciated and, under some circumstances, has significant
implications for the assessment of policy consequences by the
willingness to pay yardstick. My criticism is that conventional cost-
benefit analyses do not adequately address the difficulties involved in
valuing policy consequences under those circumstances when one of
those consequences is a significant alteration of the preferences of a
substantial number of people.
The conventional simplifying analytical assumption made by cost-
benefit analysts is that while the policy under consideration may well
affect the circumstances facing persons in numerous ways, it will not
affect those persons' underlying preference structures.23 In other words,
preferences are generally assumed to be established exogenously and are
not endogenously determined by the policy under consideration. Such a
simplifying assumption certainly facilitates analysis, but what if this is
not the case in a particular instance? The loss of explanatory power and
policy relevance that would result from basing an analysis on this
assumption when it is not satisfied may be too high a price to pay for
such analytical tractability. 24
21. See id. at 205-12.
22. See, e.g., Crespi (2008), supra note 19; Crespi (2007), supra note 19; Crespi,
supra note 17; Crespi, supra note 14.
23. See Samuel Bowles, Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of
Markets and other Economic Institutions, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 75, 75 (1998) ("Markets and
other economic institutions ... influence the evolution of values, tastes and personalities.
Economists have long assumed otherwise; the axiom of exogenous preferences is as old
as liberal political philosophy itself."); Albert 0. Hirschman, Against Parsimony: Three
Easy Ways of Complicating Some Categories ofEconomic Discourse, I EcoN. & PHIL. 7,
10 (1985) ("Economists often ... think of citizens as consumers with unchanging or
arbitrarily changing tastes in matters of civics as well as commodity-oriented behavior.
This view tends to neglect the possibility that people are capable of changing their
values."); George J. Stigler & Gary S. Becker, De Gustbus Non Est Disputandum, 67 AM.
ECON. REV. 76, 76-77 (1977) ("[O]ne may usefully treat tastes as stable over time . . . no
other approach of remotely comparable generality and power is available."); Kenneth
Dau-Schmidt, Legal Prohibitions as More Than Prices: The Economic Analysis of
Preference Shaping Policies in the Law, in LAW AND ECONOMICS: NEW AND CRITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 153 (Robin Paul Malloy & Christopher Braun eds., Peter Lang Publ'g
1995) ("The traditional economic analysis of law ... assumes that people's preferences
are exogenous.").
24. See Bowles, supra note 23, at 75 ("[By making the assumption of exogenous
preferences] the scope of economic inquiry is thereby truncated in ways which restrict its
explanatory power, policy relevance, and ethical coherence. If preferences are affected
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The questions presented by policy valuation when preferences are
endogenous with regard to the policy at issue have significant practical
consequences, since it is clear that some policies will have as one of their
impacts the substantial alteration of many of the affected persons'
preferences. 25  Environmental policies are one area where this is
particularly likely to be the case. Many persons may never have
experienced certain environmental amenities, and simply because of their
lack of familiarity with the character of those amenities they may value
them very modestly relative to their costs and therefore oppose policies
26designed to bring them into existence. Once such environmental
policies have been implemented, however, and people begin to
experience those amenities, some of those people may well reassess their
preferences in light of their greater awareness and understanding of the
benefits provided by those amenities and may now accord them a higher
value that exceeds their cost. A willingness to pay-based cost-benefit
analysis valuation of such a policy might turn out very differently if the
policy is valued by the yardstick of the post-policy implementation
preference structures than if it is valued by the pre-policy implementation
preference structures.
More generally, many policies have educational and character-
27
shaping objectives, which may sometimes even be the primary goal of
the policy at issue. If those policies are successful in achieving this
by the policies or institutional arrangements we study, we can neither accurately predict
nor coherently evaluate the likely consequences of new policies or institutions without
taking account of preference endogeniety."); Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, An Economic
Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 16
(1990) ("It is becoming increasingly apparent that the failure to address the malleability
of preferences seriously limits the explanatory power of economic analysis.").
25. See Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL
STUD. 217, 220 (1993) ("[T]here is sometimes no such thing as a fully acontextual
preference, and that preferences are endogenous to existing legal policy, including the
setting of the legal entitlement.").
26. See id. at 236-37 (giving an example of what Sunstein refers to as "adaptive
preferences").
27. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23, at 153 ("[There are] various areas in the
law ... in which legal prohibitions are not merely intended to act as a price on the
proscribed behavior, but are also intended to influence the underlying preferences of the
sanctioned parties and other members of society.").
28. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 24, at 17 ("Preference shaping ... is an important
human endeavor. It has been identified as a primary or secondary goal of childrearing,
education, religion, advertising, public service announcements, legislation,
and. . .criminal punishment. Although economists might find it useful to assume that
preference-shaping processes are exogenous to their analysis of traditional markets, when
economists expand their analysis to social institutions that are more intimately related to
the preference-shaping processes, either affecting or being affected by them, this
assumption should be relaxed. . . . Although it complicates empirical tests and introduces
greater subjectivity via the social welfare analysis, relaxing the assumption that
preferences are exogenous promises greater understanding of many social phenomena.");
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objective, some persons who originally opposed those policies may, on
the basis of their new attitudes and preferences, now regard them as
being cost-justified. In these instances, the choice between using pre-
policy implementation or instead post-policy implementation preference
structures for valuations may prove outcome-determinative.
If a policy significantly alters the preference structures of a
substantial number of persons, and if one wishes to incorporate this
preference structure endogeniety into the valuation calculations, some
difficult analytical questions are presented. Should the pre-policy
implementation preference structures be used to value the policy's
consequences, or should instead the different post-policy implementation
preference structures be used to make those valuations? If the latter,
what role, if any, should be played by any transitional post-policy
implementation preference structures that may exist for a period of time
before the final stable post-policy implementation preference structures
come into being?2 9
Under the simplifying exogenous preferences assumption, the same
preference structures are assumed to exist both before and after the
implementation of the policy, and there are also implicitly assumed to be
no transitional preference structures to complicate matters. Analysts
making this assumption for valuation purposes generally fail to make
clear in their analyses whether those preference structures are being
utilized for valuation purposes because they are the pre-policy
implementation preference structures, with the fact that they are also the
post-policy implementation preference structures not being germane, or
whether they are being utilized because they are the post-policy
implementation preference structures, with the fact that they are also the
pre-policy implementation preference structures not being germane.
There is no real need for them to address this question as to the
underlying rationale of their valuation approach if the preference
structures are assumed to be invariant.
Under endogenous preferences circumstances, however, a rationale
must be advanced that would justify the choices made among these
differing preference structures for valuation purposes. A modest body of
Hirschman, supra note 23, at 10 ("A principle purpose of publicly proclaimed laws and
regulations is to stigmatize antisocial behavior and thereby influence citizens' values and
behavior codes. This educational, value-molding function of the law is as important as its
deterrent and repressive functions.").
29. In some cases temporary, transitional preference structures may be created for
some persons by the policy's implementation, and these transitional preference structures
may persist for some time before the final, stable post-policy implementation preference
structures come into being. If so, these transitional preference structures would be
additional candidates for inclusion in a valuation framework. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER,
ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 20 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996).
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literature exists that notes the significance of the endogenous preferences
problem for policy valuation efforts30 and to a limited extent attempts to
address the problem .3  However, that scholarship is incomplete and has
not definitively resolved the conundrum and, as noted above, most cost-
benefit analysts simply ignore the implications of the possibility of
endogenous preferences in their work.
In this article, I will discuss how policy impacts should be valued in
those instances when there are significantly differing pre-policy
implementation and post-policy implementation preference structures,
and possibly also distinct transitional preference structures, for a
substantial number of affected persons. In order to more clearly focus
my analysis on these specific questions, I will limit its scope in certain
regards. First, I will take as a given the premise that people have at any
point in time coherent preferences, and that their preference structures
can be accurately ascertained and then used for determining those
persons' willingness to pay for policy benefits or to avoid policy costs.32
Given these assumptions, the main question at issue is how best to
choose among these preference structures to obtain a policy valuation
that most meaningfully reflects the preferences of the affected persons.
Second, I will consider only non-paternalistic approaches to
resolving the endogenous preferences valuation problem. I will not
explore the possibility of taking a paternalistic approach that might
utilize for valuation purposes whichever of those two or more actual
preference structures are regarded by the analyst as best reflecting the
"true" interests of the affected persons, those interests being somehow
defined apart from their actual preference structures. Nor will I consider
the even more paternalistic tact of utilizing for valuations some other
hypothetical "ideal" preference structure that the analyst believes that the
30. See, e.g., id. ("The endogeniety of preferences would appear to play havoc with
traditional approaches to welfare evaluations of economic outcomes.").
31. See generally id.; Bowles, supra note 23; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23; Sunstein,
supra note 25.
32. Not every commentator agrees with this assumption. In particular, Cass
Sunstein has argued extensively that people's preferences often "do not, in any simple
way, antedate the process that is used to elicit them ... preferences can be a function of
methods of elicitation, or construction." Cass R. Sunstein, How Law Constructs
Preferences, 86 GEO. L.J. 2637, 2652 (1998). Under those circumstances, valuations
achieved through use of those preferences would inevitably be suspect since biased by
the manner of elicitation. Sunstein has also argued that even apart from those biases
introduced by measurement efforts, "sometimes there are no acontextual preferences with
which to do normative or descriptive work," and under those circumstances
"policymakers cannot simply identify preferences and try to satisfy them since the
preferences are influenced by law, and since there is no way to identify the preferences
that would exist in the absence of law." Sunstein, supra note 25, at 221.
167
PENN STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
affected persons "should have" to further their "true" interests, and that
differs from all of the actually observed preference structures.
I will also not address in this article the important but conceptually
distinct question of whether offer prices or instead asking prices should
be utilized to establish the magnitude of willingness to pay once the
appropriate preference structures for valuation purposes have been
chosen.34 In addition, I will not consider the very difficult and
inadequately recognized problem posed by the need to value policy
consequences impacting future persons who are conceived and born after
the implementation of a policy, and for whom the policy has not merely
altered their preferences but has had the far more dramatic "person-
altering consequences" of determining their fundamental genetic
identities. I will instead limit the discussion to the questions posed with
regard to valuing policy consequences for those persons who were
already born (or at least conceived) at the time that the policy was first
implemented, or who were conceived and born post-policy
implementation but whose fundamental genetic identity was not affected
by the cascading person-altering consequences of the policy, 3 6 but who in
either instance have nevertheless had their preference structures
significantly altered by the policy in question.
I will address in this article to a limited extent the nature and
severity of the measurement difficulties involved in ascertaining these
different preference structures, and how these difficulties may as a
practical matter call for some departure from theoretically ideal valuation
procedures. I will focus this particular discussion upon how those
measurement difficulties may vary with regard to whether pre-policy
implementation or instead post-policy implementation preference
structures are being ascertained, and with regard to whether the cost-
33. I will instead accept as a premise the desirability of utilizing persons' actual
preference structures for valuation purposes in a non-paternalistic fashion, and will
consider only the questions that arise under endogenous preference circumstances where
there is more than one plausible candidate for this role. I recognize that this is a
contestable approach. Some commentators have argued that there may often not be any
such "actual" preference structures that are not biased by the method of elicitation that
can be applied for making valuations without the need for prior and inevitably
paternalistic corrections of those biases; that all revealed preference structures are
contextual and influenced by law and thus any attempt to ascertain peoples' preference
structures for valuation purposes is also an inherently paternalistic enterprise. See, e.g.,
Sunstein, supra note 32, at 2652.
34. See generally Crespi, supra note 17; Korobkin, supra note 17.
35. See Crespi (2007), supra note 19, at 10885.
36. I describe such persons in my earlier work as being the "transitional generations"
of persons conceived after the implementation of a policy but before the person-altering
consequences of that policy have become universal in scope. See id.
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benefit analysis is being conducted on a prospective or instead a
retrospective basis.
Let me here briefly summarize my overall conclusions. In my
opinion, under those circumstances where preferences structures are to a
significant extent endogenous with regard to the policy at issue, that
policy should as a general matter be evaluated solely with regard to the
post-policy implementation preference structures, rather than by the
yardstick of the pre-policy implementation preference structures. If there
are any transitional preference structures, they should be used for valuing
those particular policy consequences that occur while those transitional
preference structures are in existence. The use of an endogenous
preference valuation framework in this manner when conducting cost-
benefit analyses of certain environmental policies that may alter
preferences, and of numerous other policies that may also alter
preferences, may upon occasion have significant consequences for the
results of those analyses. This recommended endogenous preferences
valuation framework may, however, need to be modified upon occasion
to reflect preference structure estimation difficulties and to counter
potential analyst bias, particularly when conducting prospective rather
than retrospective cost-benefit analyses.
I will proceed as follows in this article. In Part II, I will briefly
discuss the efforts of several other scholars to address the problem of
incorporating endogenous preference into cost-benefit analysis valuation
efforts. I will then in Part III offer my own thoughts regarding how this
problem can be best addressed as a theoretical matter and what
adjustments in that theoretical approach are likely to be necessary to
accommodate practical measurement limitations. In Part IV of the article
I will present a brief summary of my conclusions.
II. PRIOR EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THE PROBLEM OF ENDOGENOUS
PREFERENCES WHEN MAKING VALUATIONS IN COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS
The most substantial contributions in this area have been provided
by Gary Becker, Cass Sunstein, Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, and Samuel
Bowles. Let me briefly discuss in turn the contributions of each of these
scholars.
A. The Becker "Extended Utility Function" Approach
The problem of valuing policy consequences under circumstances
of endogenous preferences can be analytically dealt with in a number of
facially different but conceptually equivalent ways. For example, one
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could redefine any situation where a policy would alter preference
structures as instead being a situation where the affected persons'
preference structures were exogenously determined and not altered by
that policy, but where there were now some additional policy impacts
specified that were just significant enough in magnitude to generate the
same overall policy valuation that would result under an endogenous
preference assumption if the post-policy implementation preference
structures were there utilized for making the valuations, but without
those newly specified policy impacts being included in the valuation
calculations. In other words, one could redefine the preference changes
caused by a policy under an endogenous preferences assumption as
instead being newly specified policy impacts of an appropriate
magnitude under an exogenous preferences assumption, and still reach
the same policy valuation results. This type of alternative conceptual
framework for dealing with endogenous preferences has been suggested
by the Noble Prize-winning economist Gary Becker in his well-known
book Accounting for Tastes.
Becker there defines the concept of an exogenously determined
"extended utility function"3 that would also include two additional
factors affecting a person's utility that are qualitatively different from the
availability of ordinary goods and services. He labels these new factors
"personal capital" and "social capital," respectively.39 The amount of
each of these capital stocks held by an individual at any point in time
would then affect the total utility that the person would obtain from the
availability of ordinary goods and services, and from the other
circumstances facing that individual, at that point in time.4 0  The
consequences of a policy for each affected individual at any point in time
would then be partly a function of the changes the policy has made in the
amount of these personal and social capital stocks. Those individual
valuations of the policy's consequences at each point in time would then
each be time-discounted to a present value as of the time of the
implementation of the policy, and then these time-specific valuations
would be aggregated into an overall assessment of the policy's
consequences for that individual. Those individual policy valuations
would then be aggregated across the population to obtain an overall
37. See BECKER, supra note 29, at 3-23.
38. Id. at 5.
39. Id. at 4 ("Personal Capital, P, includes the relevant past consumption and other
personal experiences that affect current and future utilities. Social Capital, S,
incorporates the influence of past actions of peers and others in an individual's social
network and control system.").
40. Id. at 5.
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global policy assessment.4 1 Becker argues that the conventional
exogenous preference assumption can be usefully and credibly retained
in this manner for cost-benefit analytical work, despite his recognition
that preferences are in fact often endogenous, if the valuations of policy
impacts are based upon such extended utility functions that still posit
exogenous preferences but which now also take into account the policy
impacts upon these two appropriately defined capital stock factors over
time in a suitable manner.4 2
I am reluctant to criticize in any way an economist of Becker's
stature, but I do not believe that his suggested approach solves the
endogenous preferences valuation problem. His attempt to retain the
exogenous preference assumption while mitigating its shortcomings
through the inclusion of two additional factors in the utility function
specification that together substitute for recognizing preference
endogeniety is indeed creative and interesting. But this approach
ultimately only reframes the valuation problem rather than resolving it,
and moreover does so in a manner that tends to obscure rather than
illuminate the nature of the choices that must be made.
Let me explain this point more fully. In the endogenous preferences
framework, the central question presented is whether the pre-policy
implementatioii preference structures should be used to value a policy's
consequences, or whether instead the post-policy implementation
preference structures, perhaps including any transitional preference
structures, should be used for making those valuations. Under Becker's
proposed extended utility function approach, the analogous question
posed would be whether the utility functions with the pre-policy
implementation stocks of personal and social capital, as he has defined
them, should be used to make the policy valuations, or instead whether
the utility functions with the post-policy implementation levels of these
capital stocks, and perhaps also utility functions with transitional levels
of these capital stocks, should be used for making the valuations.
41. See id. at 20 ("A welfare analysis should consider not only the initial effects on
utility when ... [the affected persons may intensely dislike the policy], nor only the
ultimate effects when . . . [the affected persons may like the policy], but the discounted
value of both the initial and later changes in utilities that incorporates the transition
between the initial and later attitudes toward [the policy].... In other words, initial
preferences should have no priority over final preferences in welfare analysis when
policies change preferences.").
42. See id. ("These difficulties [of conducting valuations where preferences are
endogenous to the policy in question], however, are intrinsic not to the endogeniety of
preferences but to inadequate incorporation of this endogeniety into welfare criteria. If
the relevant utility function for welfare analysis includes personal and social capital, the
effect on utility of. .. public policies can be evaluated without any ambiguity.").
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The close parallels between an endogenous preference approach and
Becker's extended utility function approach are fairly obvious. His
method simply transforms the need to ascertain the contours of the
different preference structures that are in existence at each point in time,
a requirement for conducting valuations under the endogenous
preferences framework to the extent that each of these preference
structures will play a part in deriving the final policy valuations, into the
need to measure the size of the different stocks of personal and social
"capital," as idiosyncratically defined by Becker, at each point in time
under an exogenous preferences assumption, to the extent that these
different capital stocks at different points in time will play a part in
deriving the final policy valuation.
There is nothing that would prohibit one from making this
transformation of analytical categories, but it is not clear what the pay-
off is for doing so. One could certainly incorporate those post-policy
implementation stocks of Beckerian personal and social capital that exist
at any point in time into the willingness to pay-based valuation
calculations in the same manner that one would incorporate the post-
policy implementation quantities of goods and services that normally
affect utility. If the parameters of the extended utility function and the
magnitude of the changes made in the personal and social capital stocks
of various individuals at each point in time were each appropriately
specified so as to yield the same valuations of policy impacts as would
the endogenous preference framework were one to use post-policy
implementation preference structures, then Becker's approach would
lead to exactly the same policy valuation results as one would obtain
under the endogenous preferences framework.
However, as noted above, this analytical tact only reframes rather
than resolves the central valuation questions posed by the existence of
endogenous preferences. The main unanswered question under the
endogenous preferences formulation of the valuation problem is whether
the post-policy implementation preference structures, permanent or
transitional, should be privileged over the pre-policy implementation
preference structures in deriving the policy valuation, and if so to what
extent. Becker's approach specifies an alternative conceptual framework
of exogenous preferences combined with newly defined personal and
social capital stocks that change in response to policy impacts, rather
than endogenous preference changes, as establishing the parameters that
need to be established to calculate the willingness to pay-based policy
valuations for each relevant period of time. But his method simply
transforms the central and difficult question presented by the endogenous
preferences framework into the equally difficult question of whether the
pre-policy implementation or instead post-policy implementation
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personal and capital stocks are to be privileged in conducting a policy
valuation, and if so, then what weight, if any, will be given to transitional
amounts of these stocks as compared to their final, stable amounts? This
new question is unfortunately left unaddressed by Becker.
B. Other Commentary Regarding Incorporating Endogenous
Preferences in Cost-Benefit Analysis
Let me now turn to consider the efforts of some other scholars to
address the endogenous preferences valuation problem. None of the few
commentators other than Gary Becker who have considered this question
in any depth, specifically Cass Sunstein, 3 Kenneth Dau-Schmidt,4 and
Samuel Bowles, 45 offer a framework for choosing the appropriate
preference structures to use to conduct a cost-benefit valuation of the
impacts of a particular policy that does not require a paternalistic
assessment on the part of the analyst as to which of these preference
structures best reflect the affected persons' "true" preference structure, or
otherwise is more deserving of respect. Let me briefly discuss each of
their contributions below, and I will then draw upon their insights and
the work of Becker in Part III of this article where I will offer my own
contributions.
1. Cass Sunstein's Views
As I have noted, this article proceeds upon the premise that, under
endogenous preference circumstances, one can accurately measure the
pre-policy implementation preference structures, post-policy
implementation preference structures, and any transitional preference
structures. Given this premise, I here address the question of how to
appropriately choose among the different policy valuations that can be
derived from each of these preference structures in a non-paternalistic
fashion. Cass Sunstein in his seminal 1993 article on endogenous
preferences, however, calls into question this entire enterprise.46
Sunstein there argues that there often are no objectively existing
preference structures that can be ascertained that merit such deference,
and that an analyst therefore often has no choice but to paternalistically
impose what she regards as the most appropriate preference structures to
use for valuation purposes. These selected preference structures may not
closely resemble any of the different pre-policy implementation or post-
43. See generally Sunstein, supra note 25.
44. See generally Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23.
45. See generally Bowles, supra note 23.
46. See generally Sunstein, supra note 25.
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policy implementation preference structures noted above, which he
argues may not even exist in any meaningful sense.
Sunstein's core argument is that legal rules or other social policies
inevitably have effects on preferences, and consequently no preference
structures can be properly regarded as pristine pre-legal and pre-political
expressions of people's "true" preferences. 4 7 Pre-policy implementation
preference structures in his view often do not merit deference for use in
valuing the policy's consequences because they are "adaptive
preferences,"48 i.e., artifacts of and psychological accommodations to the
limitations imposed by existing law and social institutions. 49  Even
though these pre-policy implementation preference structures have been
shaped by previously adopted laws and policies, rather than by the policy
at issue that is being evaluated in cost-benefit terms in advance of its
possible implementation, in Sunstein's opinion those pre-policy
implementation preference structures are often so tainted as purported
measures of "true" individual preferences because of the adaptive
preferences effects of existing laws and other social institutions that they
do not merit deference for policy valuation purposes.50 Sunstein gives
particular emphasis to arguments that debates regarding many
environmental policy questions are rendered less meaningful because
they take place against the background of pre-policy implementation
preference structures that are distorted by this adaptive preference
effect.
Sunstein also in his 1993 article briefly calls into question the use of
post-policy implementation preference structures as a basis for policy
valuation, on the general grounds that "when preferences are a function
of legal rules, the rules cannot be justified by reference to the
preferences." 5 2  There is, in his opinion, a bootstrapping problem
presented by the use of post-policy implementation preference structures;
policies cannot be meaningfully evaluated or justified by those very
preference structures that they have helped create.
47. Id. at 221-35.
48. Id. at 236-37.
49. Id. at 234-35 ("The most general point is that the preference-shaping effects of
legal rules cast doubt on the idea that environmental regulations should attempt to satisfy
or follow some aggregation of private preferences.... Sometimes there is no such thing
as a prelegal or prepolitical 'preference' that can be used as the basis for decision. If this
is so, government is not quite faced with a choice between respecting and rejecting
private preferences. This is a misdescription of the real options.").
50. Id. at 254 ("Private preferences are an inadequate basis for environmental policy
insofar as these are adaptive to an environmentally inadequate status quo.").
51. Id. at 230-42.
52. Sunstein, supra note 25, at 235.
53. See id. at 221, 234-35, 237.
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Sunstein buttresses these arguments for not utilizing either the pre-
policy implementation or the post-policy implementation preference
structures for policy valuation purposes with the related but conceptually
distinct argument that any measured preference structures, even apart
from their being distorted from "true" preferences by psychological
adaptations to the limitations imposed by pre-policy implementation
legal and political circumstances or by the effects of the policy in
question, simply do not have an objective existence independent of their
means of elicitation.5 4 There is something analogous to the "Heisenberg
uncertainty principle" at work here; any method by which an analyst
attempts to measure preference structures will strongly influence the
results obtained, rendering those results suspect as indicia of "true"
preferences even apart from the adaptative preferences and bootstrapping
effects. 5 Sunstein's more recent work shows that he is still firmly of this
opinion as to the sensitivity of measures of preference structures to the
context of and methods of their elicitation.56
Sunstein clearly recognizes that preferences are often endogenous to
a significant extent. However, as I have noted above, he implicitly
rejects the core premise of this article that it may be possible to establish
an appropriate framework for selecting among the different pre-policy
implementation and post-policy implementation preference structures for
use in valuing a policy in a non-paternalistic fashion, since he rejects all
of these preference structures as potentially being too biased and/or
unreliably ascertained to use for policy valuation purposes. He therefore
does not offer a proposed resolution of the endogenous preferences
valuation problem in the terms that I have framed it in this article. Some
of his insights, however, are nevertheless germane to the enterprise of
attempting to resolve the valuation problem viewed in these terms, and I
will draw upon those insights in Part III of this article.
Sunstein continues in his more recent work to flatly reject the idea
that policy valuations can or should be carried out in a non-paternalistic
manner that is grounded in expressed or otherwise revealed
preferences. 57  He instead endorses the more paternalistic approach of
disregarding these preferences, both pre-policy implementation
54. See Sunstein, supra note 32, at 2652.
55. See id.
56. See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1159, 1161 (2003) ("[I]n many domains, people lack clear,
stable or well-ordered preferences. What they choose is strongly influenced by details of
the context in which they make their choice, for example default rules, framing
effects ... and starting points. These contextual influences render the meaning of the
term 'preferences' unclear.").
57. See id. at 1164 ("The first misconception is that there are viable alternatives to
paternalism.").
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preferences and post-policy implementation preferences, and choosing
instead to value policies with regard to their efficacy "to move people in
welfare-promoting directions"58 that are determined to be so desirable by
some external criteria other than those persons' preferences. His attempt
to justify this approach in the face of the usual strong criticisms made of
governmental policymakers who choose to disregard expressed or
otherwise revealed preferences to purportedly achieve greater social
welfare59 is to me rather unconvincing, but that is the subject of another
article.
2. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt's Views
Kenneth Dau-Schmidt has written two important pieces relating to
endogenous preferences, each of which focuses primarily, although not
exclusively, on issues raised by the criminal law. 60  His primary
emphasis in these two articles is making clear the importance and
pervasiveness of the preference-shaping effects of many laws and social
policies, 61 and determining when preference-shaping policies are to be
preferred over policies that only shape opportunities. 62  He was not
focusing upon my inquiry regarding how to properly conduct a cost-
benefit assessment of a policy that has both opportunity-altering and
preference-shaping consequences, a topic that he addresses only
tangentially. He does, however, offer some insights that are useful for
one making this effort.
58. Id. at 1162.
59. See id. at 1166 ("Once it is understood that . .. a form of paternalism cannot be
avoided, and that the alternatives to paternalism (such as choosing options to make
people worse off) are unattractive, we can abandon the less interesting question of
whether to be paternalistic or not, and turn to the more constructive question of how to
choose among the possible choice-influencing options. To this end we make two general
suggestions. First, programs should be designed using a type of welfare analysis, one in
which a serious attempt is made to measure the costs and benefits of outcomes (rather
than relying on estimates of willingness to pay). Choosers should be given more choices
if the welfare benefits exceed the welfare costs. Second, some results from the
psychology of decisionmaking should be used to provide ex ante guidelines to support
reasonable judgments about when consumers and workers will gain most by increasing
options."). This quote clearly articulates the controversial paternalistic premise that
governmental officials, supported by "reasonable guidelines" that are grounded in
modern theories of psychology, can be trusted to accurately assess the "true" social costs
and benefits of policies without having to rely upon the expressed willingness to pay for
or to avoid policy consequences of the affected persons to make those assessments.
60. See generally Dau-Schmidt, supra note 23; Dau-Schmidt, supra note 24.
61. See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt supra note 23, at 158-68; Dau-Schmidt supra note 24, at
16.
62. See, e.g., Dau-Schmidt supra note 23, at 168-70; Dau-Schmidt supra note 24, at
14-24.
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Dau-Schmidt clearly recognizes that the existence of endogenous
preferences with regards to a policy undermines the application of
conventional social welfare criteria to evaluate that policy,63 including
the willingness to pay criterion that is generally utilized in cost-benefit
analysis under the exogenous preference assumption. The closest that he
comes to taking an explicit position as to which of the various pre-policy
implementation and post-policy implementation preference structures
should be utilized for valuation purposes in cost-benefit analysis is the
following, somewhat cryptic statement that he offers in his 1990 article
regarding what he views as the minimally acceptable properties of an
adequate social welfare function:
To ensure a rational social preference ordering [in light of the
"impossibility theorem" results demonstrated by Kenneth Arrow],
economists usually assume that interpersonal comparisons of the
intensity of individuals' preferences are possible, and that the
intensity of individuals' preferences is reflected in the social
preference ordering. If one allows preferences to vary, then it is also
necessary to assume that intertaste comparisons of the intensity of an
individual's preferences are possible, and that intertaste intensity is
also reflected in the social preference function. To account for these
interpersonal and intertaste comparisons, the social welfare function
has been modeled as a summation of individual utility functions
which reflect the intensity of preference in their measure of utility.
I have assumed for the purposes of the inquiry presented in this
article that the pre-policy implementation preference structures, the post-
policy implementation preference structures, and any transitional
preferences structures can each be accurately ascertained, and the
primary question here considered is how to combine the policy
valuations derived from each of these different preference structures for
overall policy valuation purposes. Under this assumption, the
willingness of any individual to pay for a given policy can be precisely
determined under each of these preference structures, thus satisfying
Dau-Schmidt's suggested minimal requirements for a valuation
63. There are a variety of possible social welfare criteria that can be derived from
individual utility functions that could be used for policy assessment. The approach
utilized by cost-benefit analysis in aggregating willingness to pay across all affected
persons is only one of the many possible options. Many of the proposed social welfare
criteria, however, are grounded in some fashion upon individual preferences as to
possible states of society. All social welfare functions of this type are faced with the
need to deal somehow with the endogenous preferences problem in making their
assessments of policies that alter preferences. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 24, at 6-8.
64. Id. at 7-8.
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methodology that it be able to make interpersonal and intertaste
comparisons.
These minimal requirements, however, do not mandate that any
particular choices be made among the different policy valuations derived
from each of these different preference structures in making the overall
policy valuation. However, the major thrust of Dau-Schmidt's work is to
emphasize the importance of recognizing the endogeniety of preferences
in areas such as the criminal law where preference-shaping is often one
of the primary goals of the policies undertaken, and to offer suggestions
regarding how to assess when such preference-shaping measures are
appropriate to undertake. It is consequently most unlikely that he would
embrace a valuation methodology that totally ignored the post-policy
implementation preference structures and any transitional preference
structures, since this approach would be tantamount to making the
exogenous preference assumption that he rejects as particularly
inadequate in those contexts.
3. Samuel Bowles' Views
Samuel Bowles is a prominent economist who has emphasized in an
article the importance of taking into account preference endogeniety for
both descriptive and normative purposes.65 While clearly recognizing
the advantages of the conventional exogenous preferences assumption
for analytical tractability and for placing limits upon excessive
paternalism, 66 Bowles also recognizes that under many circumstances the
lack of realism of this assumption undercuts its usefulness.67
Bowles' work parallels that of Dau-Schmidt in that he attempts to
emphasize the importance of recognizing preference endogeniety in
many important policy-making contexts. He also suggests the general
65. See Bowles, supra note 23, at 75 ("If preferences are affected by the policies or
institutional arrangements we study, we can neither accurately predict nor coherently
evaluate the likely consequences of new policies or institutions without taking account of
preference endogeniety.").
66. See id at 102 ("The implicit premise that policies . . . do not affect preferences
has much to recommend it: the premise provides a common if minimal analytical
framework applicable to a wide range of issues of public concern, it expresses a prudent
antipathy toward paternalistic attempts at social engineering of the psyche. It modestly
acknowledges how little we know about the effects of economic structure and policy on
preferences, and it erects a barrier both to ad hoc explanation and to the utopian thinking
of those who invoke the mutability of human dispositions in order to sidestep difficult
questions of scarcity and social choice.").
67. See id at 105 ("Realism, however, cannot be among the virtues invoked on
behalf of the exogenous preferences assumption. .. . A broader concept of market failure
is thus required, one encompassing the effects of economic policies and institutions on
preferences and for this reason more adequate for the consideration of an appropriate mix
of markets, communities, families, and states in economic governance.").
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contours of the comprehensive research program that he believes is
called for to increase our currently inadequate understanding of the
processes of preference formation and alteration, and describes the
practical significance that such greater understanding of those processes
would have for economic and social policy. 69 But while Bowles notes
generally that preference endogeniety has implications for policy
evaluation, 70 he does not offer any specific suggestions germane to this
article's inquiry as to how the different pre-policy implementation and
post-policy implementation preference structures, once determined,
should be utilized for cost-benefit analysis valuation purposes. His
comments do, however, suggest caution in giving substantial weight to
post-policy implementation preference structures in making policy
valuations under circumstances where the uncertainties regarding the
accuracy of the forecasting of those future preference structures are
sufficiently great to raise concerns of covert paternalistic biases being
imposed by analysts.
III. MY APPROACH TO MAKING VALUATIONS IN COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS UNDER ENDOGENOUS PREFERENCES CIRCUMSTANCES
Before I offer my own thoughts for the reader's consideration as to
the most appropriate theoretical framework for the incorporation of
endogenous preferences into cost-benefit analysis, I would like to first
briefly point out a few practical considerations that may have some
significance for making proper use of the results of the theoretical
inquiry. I will then present my theoretical analysis and conclusions, and
later revisit these practical considerations and discuss the extent to which
they may impose limitations upon the use of my suggested valuation
methodology.
A. Practical Considerations that Should Be Kept in Mind When
Applying an Endogenous Preferences Valuation Framework
1. Under Some Circumstances the Choice Among Alternative
Preference Structures is Mooted
First, there are some instances where even though a policy may
significantly alter the preference structures of a substantial number of
68. See id. at 102-03.
69. See id. at 104-05.
70. See id at 104 ("[P]reference endogeniety gives rise to a kind of market failure
and suggests a reconsideration of some aspects of normative economics.").
71. See Bowles, supra note 23, at 102.
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persons, it will not be necessary for a cost-benefit analyst to choose
between valuations derived from the pre-policy implementation
preference structure and those derived from the post-policy
implementation preference structure. This will be the case whenever the
net benefits calculations under either set of preference structures lead to
the same conclusion as to the merits of the policy at issue relative to
those of the other policy alternatives. In other words, if the valuation
calculations are invariant in the sense that they would lead to
endorsement (or rejection) of the policy in question relative to the
alternatives when valuations are done with regard to either of these two
preference structures, then the issue is rendered moot and no choice
among them need be made.72 For example, with regard to advertising
expenditures which presumably have at least some effect in altering
consumer preferences as well as providing information, it has been
argued that it is generally unnecessary to choose between using pre-
advertising preferences or post-advertising preferences in order to value
the effects of the advertising expenditures, since the results will usually
not be significantly affected by the choice.
As a general matter, however, when there are significant differences
in the contours of the pre-policy implementation and post-policy
implementation preference structures for a substantial number of affected
persons, a cost-benefit analyst might well reach different conclusions as
to the relative merits of the policy in question as compared to the
possible alternatives depending upon which set of preference structures
was used for valuing the policy's consequences. Under those
circumstances, a choice between these preference structures for valuation
purposes will have to be made.
72. However, even if all of these preference structures would yield identical policy
recommendations as compared to the merits of the policy alternatives, a person following
Cass Sunstein's paternalistic recommendations might reject all of those preference
structures and substitute instead for valuation purposes another set of preference
structures which when used for valuations in the analyst's opinion better facilitates
achieving social welfare. See generally Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 56.
73. Avinash Dixit & Victor Norma, Advertising and Welfare, 9 BELL J. EcON. 1, 2
(1978) ("[I]n general, advertising that is beneficial at the margin as judged by
preadvertising tastes will also be beneficial according to postadvertising tastes, and
advertising that is harmful according to the latter will also be harmful when judged by the
former."). This sweeping claim is certainly a counter-intuitive result, since one would
expect advertisers to attempt to alter preferences in favor of the advertised goods and
services rather than merely limit themselves to providing information as to their
properties and availability and that such preference-shaping efforts may or may not be
successful.
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2. Preference Structure Estimation Difficulties May Limit the
Ability to Implement the Theoretically Appropriate Valuation
Approach
There are generally difficulties of one sort or another that will be
encountered in estimating the contours of preference structures,
particularly with regards to preference structures that do not yet exist, or
no longer exist, at the time of estimation. In addition, there are
differential difficulties encountered in estimating preference structures
depending upon whether the cost-benefit analysis is being undertaken
prospectively in advance of a policy's implementation or is instead being
carried out retrospectively in order to assess whether a policy that has
been implemented has had the desired results. Let me address each of
these problems in turn.
a. General Preference Structure Estimation Difficulties
It is of course often difficult even under the conventional
simplifying exogenous preference assumption for cost-benefit analysts to
ascertain the contours of the applicable preference structures so as to
calculate the willingness to pay-based valuations of the consequences of
the policies under consideration. There is often a lack of the revealed
preference data that would be most useful for ascertaining these
preferences, and the various methods used by analysts to ascertain
preferences in the absence of such data are open to criticism.74  This
problem obviously becomes more severe under endogenous preferences
assumptions where two or more different preference structures may need
to be ascertained. The practical difficulties involved in determining the
contours of each of perhaps several preference structures suggests that it
may often be infeasible to attempt to ascertain the contours of
transitional (and perhaps short-lived) preference structures, and that the
most that can reasonably be accomplished in many instances would be to
estimate only two distinct preference structures-the pre-policy
implementation preference structures and the final stable long-term post-
policy implementation preference structures-and then choose which of
these two preference structures should be utilized to value the policy's
consequences. It may even in some instances be impossible to estimate
with any real confidence the post-policy implementation preference
structures, forcing the analyst to in effect make his valuations under an
implicit exogenous preference assumption even when that assumption is
recognized to be false.
74. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 25, at 208-10.
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b. Prospective and Retrospective Cost-Benefit Analyses Present
Different Kinds of Problems for Estimating the Applicable
Preference Structures
Another point worth keeping in mind is that the practical difficulties
presented by the need to determine the contours of the relevant
preference structures will be different both in kind and in severity
depending whether the cost-benefit analysis is being done prospectively
or instead retrospectively. Cost-benefit analyses are most commonly
done prospectively as part of the process of reaching a decision as to
whether to implement a particular policy. Under those circumstances,
the pre-policy implementation preference structures already exist and can
ideally be empirically ascertained. However, the subsequently
resulting post-policy implementation preferences structures do not yet
exist before the implementation of the policy. They will have to be
projected solely on the basis of estimates of the impacts that the policy
will have on the pre-policy implementation preference structures. Given
our limited understanding of the processes of preference formation and
alteration,76 such projections will be relatively uncertain and subject to
additional sources of error that go beyond the difficulties inherent in
ascertaining existing preference structures.
This need to forecast the contours of post-policy implementation
preference structures raises a real concern than an analyst might be
tempted to utilize result-oriented projections of preference structure
alterations that are formulated with the hidden agenda of either favoring
or disfavoring the policy at issue.77 Given the inherent uncertainty of
such projections of future preference structures, these kinds of analyst
manipulations may be difficult or impossible to recognize and discredit
prior to the implementation of the policy, by which time it may be too
late to effectively revisit the decision.
This practical concern as to the potential for analyst bias that would
be difficult or impossible to police adequately might call for giving
relatively greater weight to valuations derived from the more easily
ascertained existing pre-policy implementation preference structures, and
correspondingly giving relatively lesser weight to the more subjective
and uncertain projections of post-policy implementation preferences
structures, than would be justified by purely theoretical considerations
were there not such significant differentials in the measurement
difficulties presented by the need to establish the contours of the
75. At least, in theory, this can be done, although determining the relevant individual
preference structures in the absence of revealed preference data can be very difficult.
76. See Bowles, supra note 23, at 102-03.
77. See id. at 102.
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alternative preference structures. In a case where the estimates of post-
policy implementation preference structures are particularly uncertain,
this concern might even justify relying solely upon the pre-policy
implementation preference structures-in effect reimposing the
assumption of exogeniety of preferences for the policy at issue under
circumstances where this assumption is recognized to be false-in order
to avoid the possibility of being misled by analyst bias.
Cost-benefit analyses are, however, sometimes done retrospectively
rather than prospectively in an attempt to determine whether a policy has
been successful in achieving its objectives, though this effort of
revisiting policies with the advantage of hindsight is not undertaken
nearly as often as some commentators would prefer.18  Under those
retrospective analysis circumstances, the post-policy implementation
preference structures exists at the time at which the analysis is conducted
and can ideally be empirically ascertained. In addition, the pre-policy
implementation preference structures and any transitional preference
structures, while they would no longer exist at the time of the analysis,
would presumably have left some historical record and can be more
accurately ascertained than can post-policy implementation preference
structures in the prospective analysis context where they can only be
forecast.
This difference in analytical context suggests that there should be
somewhat less concern about the possibility of hidden analyst bias in
preference structures estimation for retrospective cost-benefit analyses
than for prospective analyses. In other words, the differential difficulties
presented with regard to establishing the contours of preference
structures that do not exist at the time that the analysis is conducted are
more serious in the prospective cost-benefit analysis context than they
are in the retrospective analysis context. Therefore, the practical
concerns about avoiding potential sources of analyst bias that might call
for giving greater weight to the valuations derived from the pre-policy
implementation preference structures than to those valuations that are
derived from estimated post-policy implementation preference structures
in the prospective analysis context are more significant than are the
comparable concerns that would call for giving greater weight to
valuations derived from post-policy implementation preference structures
than to those derived from the pre-policy implementation preference
structures in the retrospective analysis context. It may, therefore, be the
case that the policy valuations derived from endogenous preferences
assumptions should under some circumstances perhaps be calculated
somewhat differently for prospective cost-benefit analyses than for
78. See, e.g., Hahn & Tetlock, supra note 7, at 77-78.
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retrospective analyses, even absent any theoretical reasons for such
disparate treatment.
B. A Proposed Methodology for Combining Valuations Obtained
Through the Use of Different Preference Structures
To provide a context for my subsequent analysis, I ask the reader to
assume for the sake of argument that a cost-benefit analyst wishes to
evaluate the impacts of a policy, either prospectively or retrospectively,
under circumstances where the policy will have (or has had) significant
effects upon the preferences of a substantial number of people. In other
words, assume that there initially exists one set of preference structures
that characterizes those persons' pre-policy implementation preferences,
but that another and different stable set of preference structures will
characterize those persons' preferences after the policy has been
implemented for some period of time, and perhaps one or even a series of
transitional preference structures will also characterize those persons'
preferences at various times during the transition period to their final
stable post-policy implementation preference structures. Assume also
for now that each of these preference structures can be accurately
ascertained so that the uncertainty of estimation and analyst bias issues
discussed in Parts III.A.2.a. and b. do not arise. Finally, further assume
that one is taking a non-paternalistic stance under which one is
committed to deferring to the extent possible to the preferences of the
affected persons. Given these assumptions, what combination of policy
valuations derived from each of these preference structures would be the
most appropriate theoretical framework to use for valuing the policy
impacts in accordance with the underlying willingness to pay principle
that essentially defines cost-benefit analysis?
I have concluded that at least in most instances the post-policy
implementation preference structures should be used to value policy
consequences, rather than the pre-policy implementation preference
structures, for both prospective and retrospective cost-benefit analyses.
The most intuitively plausible justification for this choice is the obvious
fact that the post-policy implementation preference structures embody
the actual preferences that will exist when the policy consequences are
experienced by the affected persons. This justification is given further
support by Dau-Schmidt's argument that to use the pre-policy
implementation preference structures to value those policies that are
intended partially or even primarily to alter preferences would be to
completely miss the point of those policies.
Sunstein, as discussed above, is for various reasons critical of using
either pre-policy implementation or post-policy implementation
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preference structures to value policies, but his arguments certainly cannot
be read to favor the use of the pre-policy implementation preference
structures over the post-policy implementation preference structures for
making valuations; if anything, they would suggest the contrary. Neither
Becker nor Bowles specifically address this choice among preference
structures for valuation purposes question in their work, except that
Becker briefly notes that "initial preferences should have no priority over
final preferences in welfare analysis when policies change
preferences," 79 and that Bowles notes the potential for analyst bias in the
estimation of post-policy implementation preference structures, an issue I
will later address when considering practical limitations upon the use of
an endogenous preferences valuation methodology.
I offer the "at least in most instances" qualification in my
recommendation above because one can certainly conceive of extreme
circumstances where valuations that are made solely on the basis of post-
policy implementation preference structures can be criticized as a means
of attempting to justify undesirable policies on the basis of distorted
preferences that the policies themselves have created.80 As a practical
matter, however, most policies do not appear to directly distort
preferences but merely provide more information that allow persons the
option to alter their preferences, but does not force them to do so. I
therefore do not think the bootstrapping concern adverted to by Sunstein
significantly undercuts the argument for relying solely upon the post-
policy implementation preference structures for policy valuation in the
usual cases.
This approach of using post-policy implementation preference
structures to value policies that alter preferences will tend to favor those
environmental policies and other preference-altering policies for which
the post-policy implementation preference structures are more favorable
to the policy in question when weighing the trade-offs between policy
benefits and costs. In some instances, this effect could be outcome-
determinative; a policy option that is regarded as inferior when assessed
by the yardstick of the pre-policy implementation preference structures
may prove to be the preferred alternative when assessed with regard to
the post-policy implementation preference structures. I have argued in
79. BECKER, supra note 29, at 20.
80. One can imagine extreme examples of this situation. Would anyone accept as a
justification for imposing forced lobotomies on people the fact that post-lobotomy, those
persons seemed content with their new lot in life? As a less extreme example, a policy
that facilitated access to addictive drugs might well be favorably regarded by subsequent
addicts who had initially opposed those policies pre-addiction. Should the valuations by
the addicts then be regarded as definitive as to the value of the addictive drug access
policy?
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this article that under these circumstances the latter, more favorable
assessment of the policy in question is the correct cost-benefit
assessment.
My decision to endorse the use of the post-policy implementation
preference structures for valuation purposes raises the derivative question
as to what weight to give to transitional preference structures, where they
exist, relative to the final stable post-policy implementation preference
structures. My conclusion here is in general accord with Becker's
discussion of the proper roles that time-discounting and preference
structure duration should play in policy valuation and should be
relatively uncontroversial. Policy consequences that occur while a
transitional preference structures exist should be valued on the basis of
those transitional preference structures and then time-discounted to a
present value based on when those consequences occur. Once the final
stable post-policy implementation preference structures have come into
existence, all subsequent policy consequences should be valued in
accordance with those preference structures and then time-discounted to
a present value as appropriate.
Under this discounting approach, the longer that a transitional set of
preference structures exists, other things being equal, the more weight
they will be given in the overall policy valuation. This seems most
sensible. In addition, the time-discounting applied to the valuations
derived from each of the applicable post-policy implementation
preference structures to convert them all to present value terms will
render those valuations commensurate for the purpose of aggregation
into an overall policy valuation.
This endogenous preferences valuation framework that I
recommend here on theoretical grounds may, however, need to be
practically modified in some instances to reflect the preference structure
estimation difficulties and potential analyst biases that I have discussed
in Part III.A.2.a. and b. I will address these issues in the next subsection
of this article.
C. Recognizing Practical Limitations on an Endogenous Preferences
Valuation Methodology
As noted above, there may sometimes be severe difficulties
involved in estimating the contours of transitional preference structures.
In such instances, it may be necessary as a practical matter to make the
simplifying assumption that the final stable post-policy implementation
preference structures will immediately come into existence upon the
implementation of the policy. In those instances where the transitional
preference structures are short-lived or where they do not differ
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significantly from the final stable post-policy implementation preference
structures, or both, this simplifying assumption is unlikely to introduce
significant error into the valuation calculations.
Most cost-benefit analyses are done prospectively, and in some
instances the analyst may unfortunately not only be unable to determine
the contours of any transitional preference structures, but also unable to
estimate with any confidence even the contours of the final stable post-
policy implementation preference structures. Under these circumstances,
there is no ideal way to proceed, and a difficult choice is presented as to
the best analytical approach.
One could direct the analyst to proceed with the policy valuation
exercise on the basis of the pre-policy implementation preference
structures, assuming that they can be empirically ascertained with
reasonable accuracy, essentially utilizing the exogenous preferences
framework in a situation where this assumption is known or at least
believed to be inaccurate. On the other hand, one could direct the analyst
to persevere with the endogenous preferences valuation approach in the
face of this difficulty and use the best estimate of the post-policy
implementation preference structure(s) that she can ascertain. This latter
tact of course raises the possibility that the analyst may incorporate into
the cost-benefit analysis highly speculative and biased estimates of these
preference structures that are designed to justify a particular result that
she favors, and that will be difficult or impossible for others to recognize
as such and criticize. This problem of potential and effectively
unreviewable analyst bias will, as previously discussed, be much less of
a concern in the retrospective cost-benefit analysis context where the
post-policy implementation preference structures exist and can
presumably be empirically estimated with some reasonable accuracy, and
where there is no need under my suggested valuation approach to
undertake the more difficult exercise of estimating the contours of the
former pre-policy implementation preference structures on the basis of
historical evidence.
IV. CONCLUSION
Cost-benefit analysis is the most important policy evaluation
technique now used in American public sector decision making. It is
therefore crucial that these analyses be properly conducted. The
conventional assumption made by cost-benefit analysts is that individual
preference structures are not altered by any of the policies that are under
consideration. This simplifying exogenous preferences assumption is not
always satisfied, however, and in some instances the preference
structures of a substantial proportion of the people who are impacted by a
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policy are endogenous in that they are also significantly altered by that
policy. Under those endogenous preferences circumstances, an
important question is presented as to whether the willingness to pay-
based valuations of the impacts of the policies called for by the cost-
benefit methodology should be calculated with regard to the pre-policy
implementation preference structures, or instead with regard to the
different post-policy implementation preference structures, including any
transitional preference structures that may exist for a period of time, or
perhaps with regard to some combination of the above.
Several prominent scholars have previously addressed aspects of
this inquiry, including most importantly Gary Becker, Cass Sunstein,
Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, and Samuel Bowles. While each of those writers
has made a substantial contribution to the effort, the endogenous
preferences valuation question has not yet been definitively resolved and
virtually all cost-benefit analysts continue to ignore the implications of
the possibility of endogenous preferences in their work. In this article, I
have assessed the merits of Becker's extended utility function valuation
approach, and of the various valuation suggestions offered by Sunstein,
Dau-Schmidt, and Bowles. Within a framework of hopefully reasonable
assumptions that I have made as to the ability of analysts to ascertain the
contours of preference structures, I have offered my own thoughts
regarding how the endogenous preferences valuation problem can be best
addressed in a non-paternalistic fashion.
My main conclusion is that the willingness to pay-based valuations
of policies provided by cost-benefit analyses should be derived solely
from the post-policy implementation preference structures, as a general
matter. If there are any transitional preferences structures, they should
also be used to value those policy consequences that occur while those
transitional preference structures are in existence. This valuation
framework recognizes the important fact that post-policy implementation
preferences are the actual preferences that will exist when the policy
consequences are experienced by the affected persons, recognizes that
many policies will alter and are even designed to alter preferences, and
gives proper weight to the timing of policy consequences and the
duration of various post-policy implementation preference structures.
This recommended cost-benefit valuation framework will be more
favorable to those environmental and other policies that have as one of
their consequences the alteration of preferences in a manner that favors
the policy at issue, and in my opinion that favoritism is justified for the
reasons discussed above. As I have also discussed, however, this
theoretical endogenous preferences valuation framework may need to be
modified at times to accommodate preference structure estimation
difficulties and to counter potential analyst bias, particularly with regard
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to prospective cost-benefit analyses. My hope is that cost-benefit
analysts will come to recognize the shortcomings of invariably assuming
that preferences are exogenous with regard to the policies under
consideration, and will give more thought to ways of incorporating
preference endogeniety into their analyses. I also hope that this article
will provide them with some assistance in this effort.

